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Abstract
The cost of climate policy depends on the no-policy alternative
without which the opportunity cost of climate action cannot be de-
termined. This reference path has to reflect the current failure in the
market for carbon emissions: due to a negative externality, private
investment decisions do not consider the climate damage they entail;
agents overinvest in conventional capital and underinvest in climate
capital. Internalization of climate damage lowers the private return to
capital; agents reduce investment in favor of mitigation and consump-
tion. Optimal climate mitigation increases welfare of the present and
the future. Simulation of the inefficient no-policy scenario in DICE-07
confirms that this point numerically.
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1 Introduction
How costly is climate policy? In economic analysis, the question of “how
costly” is commonly conceptualized in terms of the opportunity cost. In the
context of climate change this cost is framed in terms of the resources present
generations need to divert from consumption toward mitigation to the benefit
of future generations—the sacrifice of climate policy. The discount factor
looms large in this debate since it determines what weight is given to the
distant benefits of mitigation relative to the sacrifice incurred today. In the
(optimal) policy scenario a lower discount factor attaches greater weight to
the benefits of mitigation relative to the costs and induces a shift to earlier
and higher mitigation efforts.
The opportunity cost of a policy scenario, however, also crucially de-
pends on the reference point. Virtually all researchers agree that the main
economic cause of climate change is a market failure in the form of a nega-
tive externality. Stern (2007, p. 27) even regards it ”[...] as market failure
on the greatest scale the world has seen”. Accounting for the greenhouse
gas (GHG) market failure in the reference path creates the need to re-assess
the conventional wisdom of a climate sacrifice. The presence of externali-
ties renders competitive equilibrium allocations inefficient. Foley (2009) and
Stern (2010) demonstrate that in the context of climate change this ineffi-
ciency induces agents to perceive the returns to productive assets larger than
would be socially optimal. As private and social cost calculations diverge,
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agents overinvest in conventional capital and underinvest in climate capital
(or mitigation). An internalization of the externality leads to a correction of
price signals. The return to capital, now factoring in climate damage, falls.
Agents reduce their investment in conventional capital in favor of increased
mitigation and consumption. The opportunity cost might not be so large
as initially thought or even be an “opportunity benefit”.1 More importantly,
since the discount factor affects both scenarios in the same way, its level
might not be so crucial after all.
This argument emphasizes the choice between conventional and mitiga-
tion investment over the one between consumption and mitigation. It is based
on the assumption that investment and consumption decisions are taken en-
dogenously and in response to price signals. Some of the most prominent
integrated assessment models (IAMs), such as the PAGE model of the Stern
Review (Hope, 2006) and the FUND model of Anthoff and Tol (2009), do
not model investment and consumption behavior explicitly. The DICE-07
model of, most recently, Nordhaus (2008) does build on a Ramsey-Keynes
framework, but still finds the presence of the sacrifice of climate policy. This
is due to the usage of a theoretically inconsistent baseline case in which the
externality is internalized but mitigation efforts are exogenously constrained
1This logic is widely understood by many economists: Nordhaus (2007) proposes a
policy experiment which “... keeps consumption the same for the present but rearranges
societal investments away from conventional capital (structure, equipment, education and
the like) to investments in abatement of greenhouse gas emissions (in ‘climate capital’, so
to speak).” He and many others, however, fail to acknowledge that this analysis springs
from a path on which over-accumulation occurs due to the GHG externality.
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to zero. Such an intertemporal allocation is efficient, since agents factor in
the climate damage caused by their capital stock when making the invest-
ment choice. Each agent’s awareness of her capital stock’s contribution to
the deleterious effects of the unmitigated emissions in combination with the
absence of any mitigation instrument leads to lower returns to capital. In-
vestment shares decrease, thereby eroding the base for a rearrangement of
societal investment plans toward higher mitigation and consumption levels
under optimal policy. The absence of the externality aspect in the no-policy
scenarios of these models might also explain the emphasis on issues of in-
tergenerational equity over those of market failure and imperfection in the
discussion of the economics of climate change.2
The fact that there exists a market failure for GHG emissions has long
been understood (for early acknowledgments see Nordhaus, 1977, 1994; Schelling,
1992; for more recent statements see Arrow, 2007; Dasgupta, 2008; Stern,
2007; Weitzman, 2007). Chichilnisky (1994) and Chichilnisky and Heal
(1994) were among the first to correctly account for the public good nature
of the atmosphere in their economic analysis. For some reason, however,
these theoretical considerations have not influenced applied work. Shiell and
Lyssenko (2008) recognize this shortcoming and outline a straightforward
method of computing an approximate externality path in IAMs using the
standard optimization software GAMS. Since their focus is on the asymp-
2Given that this paper deals with the importance of incorporating the externality aspect
into the modeling of the no-policy reference path, I will focus on models which allow for
endogenous investment decisions when referring to IAMs.
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totic behavior of the reference path in previous versions of DICE, they fail to
acknowledge the importance of the correctly specified reference path for the
question of the opportunity cost of climate policy. Rezai et al. (2011) use
a simple, small-scale IAM to demonstrate that the possibility of investment
portfolio reallocation is plausible and of practical importance. The contri-
bution of this paper is to demonstrate the absence of the sacrifice of climate
policy in DICE-07, a popular IAM normally used to find the opposite.
To do so, I examine multiple candidate solutions for the no-policy path
and conclude that given current modeling standards of rational expectations
only the one in which agents misleadingly perceive a zero price of emissions
is plausible. In section 3, I present the DICE-07 model and how to include
such a form of market failure in it. Section 4 discusses the details of the
computational implementation. In section 5, I use the externality baseline to
show that the alleged sacrifice of climate policy is absent in DICE. Optimal
climate policy increases the welfare of the present and the future.
It is important to emphasize that the finding that there is no intergener-
ational trade-off at the heart of the social choice problem of global warming
mitigation does not render the debate on intergenerational equity redundant.
Such considerations are crucial in identifying the optimal policy response to
climate change. As illustrated in figure 1 below, the preferences for dis-
counting and consumption-smoothing are the main determinants in selecting
the welfare-maximizing OPT allocation. They pin down the exact levels of
mitigation efforts, world temperature, and environmental damage along the
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optimal plan.3
A qualified caveat is in order: Since DICE-07 utilizes a deterministic,
infinitely-lived agent framework, it cannot discuss the important issues of
true generational conflict and of risk, uncertainty, and catastrophic climate
change adequately.4
2 How to conceptualize the no-policy base-
line?
The question of how to calculate the no-policy alternative is not trivial. In
the following I discuss three candidate scenarios proposed by various authors
and the subtle differences between them. A permissible baseline solution
needs to feature two important aspects of the current real world: (i) agents
are aware of climate change and adjust their decisions to it and (ii) agents
have the mitigation instrument available but effectively choose not to use it.
2.1 Business-as-usual (BAU) baseline
Consider first an economy in which the emission of GHG poses a negative
externality. The externality leads the representative agent to assume that
her contribution to global warming is negligible and, as a consequence, that
3See Asheim (2010) for a review of the literature on axiomatic analyses of intergener-
ational equity.
4The interested reader is referred to Karp and Rezai (2011) and Weitzman (2007) and
the references therein.
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her investments do not contribute to the problem. In calculating the returns
to those investments, she ignores the climate damage caused by them. She,
therefore, values the returns to her conventional investments higher than
they would be under an efficient allocation of resources and overinvests in
conventional capital and underinvests in mitigation efforts. If the externality
is large enough, she will in fact divert no resources to mitigation. The agent,
however, correctly foresees the emissions time profile and the climate damage
they entail and alters her decisions accordingly.
This scenario captures both aspects of the current state of affairs: In-
vestors have the choice between conventional and climate-friendly invest-
ments, but they mostly opt for the former so that abatement is effectively
zero. Yet, they are far-sighted enough to account for climate change in their
decisions and would, for example, not happily build long-lived infrastructure
like a coal-fired power plant on low-lying, undefended coastal land.
Climate policy corrects the price for emissions such that the agent realizes
the effect of her investment decisions on the climate. This lowers the return
to conventional capital and increases the return to mitigation. The agent
rearranges investments toward climate capital as envisioned by Nordhaus in
his policy experiment. Rezai et al. (2011) refer to the externality baseline as
business-as-usual or BAU. Conceptually, it is a rational-expectations com-
petitive equilibrium, but an inefficient one due to the market imperfection.
6
2.2 Constrained-optimal (COPT) baseline
In the second candidate solution the externality is internalized; the agent un-
derstands her contribution to the problem and would choose positive abate-
ment levels, but she cannot due to the exogenous, binding zero-mitigation
constraint. In the absence of mitigation, the agent recognizes that the only
way to avoid the deleterious effects of climate change is to avoid carbon-
emitting capital stock. This insight lowers the return to conventional capital
and, in turn, investment.
The effect of climate policy in this scenario is to make available the miti-
gation instrument. Positive investment in mitigation averts the most severe
aspects of climate change and increases the return to conventional capital.
This induces the agent to also increase conventional investment. Consump-
tion and welfare levels suffer under climate policy. The climate sacrifice
emerges.
Investors in this scenario are not only far-sighted enough to account for
climate change in their decisions, but they also understand that it is their in-
vestments that are causing the problem. They would choose climate-friendly
investments over conventional ones, but they are not allowed to do so. In-
stead they abandon the most harmful investments. In the example given
above, the investor not only correctly refrains from low-lying, undefended
coastal land, but stops building coal-fired power plants altogether. This is
baseline path of Nordhaus (2008).5 It is not a permissible baseline solution
5 Nordhaus (2008, p.65) defines his baseline as “[...] a world in which there are no
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as defined above, because agents would choose positive mitigation levels if
they were allowed to. Since this allocation is optimal due to the internaliza-
tion of the externality but exogenously constrained, I will refer to it as the
constrained-optimal (COPT) baseline.
Conceptionally, it is not obvious how the zero-mitigation constraint can be
justified within the representative-agent rational-expectations methodology.
Perfect price signals induce rational agents with perfect foresight to adopt
an optimal allocation which includes positive mitigation efforts. The COPT
scenario can only be maintained if one assumes an inconsistent combination
of the information available to the representative agent: on the one hand,
she correctly estimates the marginal social cost of emissions in making her
consumption, investment, and production decisions. On the other hand,
she seems to ignore the availability of mitigation technologies, despite this
understanding of the marginal social cost of emissions. To arrive at a COPT
scenario, the agent has to perceive the marginal social cost of emitting as zero
(the only price that justifies no mitigation), while at the same time perceiving
the true carbon price in her decision on how much output to consume and
how much to re-invest. These two assumptions are clearly inconsistent with
controls for two and a half centuries. In this scenario, emissions are uncontrolled until
2250, after which a full set of controls is imposed.”
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each other.6
2.3 Difference between BAU and COPT
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between COPT and BAU in relation to the
optimal policy scenario (OPT) in terms of the intertemporal production pos-
sibility frontier (PPF). In the optimal policy scenario agents have available
both instruments, investment and abatement. In equilibrium they choose
the welfare-maximizing bequest of conventional and climate capital.
Under the COPT reference path investment in climate capital is con-
strained to zero. While in equilibrium, agents still choose the welfare-maximizing
bequest of conventional and climate capital, the absence of mitigation limits
this possibility considerably. The COPT PPF lies further inside the OPT
one as the weight put on the future increases.
If the GHG externality is not internalized, zero mitigation levels are cho-
sen just like in COPT. The BAU competitive equilibrium is inefficient, so
that the BAU PPF lies consistently inside to the COPT one. This is due
to the divergence between social and private cost of carbon: If present gen-
erations want to shift consumption to the future, they forgo consumption
to fund higher investment levels. Future generations, however, do not ben-
6The Kyoto Protocol can be seen as an argument for modeling the baseline with at
least partial internalization of the externality. This reasoning, however, does not resolve
the inconsistency at the heart of the COPT. Once a cap-and-trade scheme or tax system
creates a positive price for emissions, agents will invest resources in mitigation. A baseline
reflecting such an international agreement would be a combination of the optimal and
BAU, not of the optimal and COPT.
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efit from the bequest due to the high environmental damage caused by the
investment-related emissions.
Figure 1: The production possibility frontiers in terms of present and future
consumption of the optimal policy scenario (OPT) and two possible reference
paths (COPT and BAU). Depending on the reference path, the adoption of
optimal climate policy raises or lowers present consumption.
The debate on discounting and consumption smoothing enters figure 1
because these parameters pin down the (welfare-maximizing) competitive
equilibrium allocation along the PPFs. The allocations chosen in figure 1 are
representative for a wide range of parameters and reflect the numerical find-
ings based on DICE below: the BAU allocation has the lowest consumption
today and in the future due to the inefficiency. Both levels could be raised
if the externality was internalized—the private cost of carbon increased to
match the social cost—even in the absence of mitigation. Future generations
would gain from higher levels of climate capital and lower levels of conven-
tional capital, present generations could divert resources from investment to
consumption to achieve such a portfolio reallocation. Given preferences for
discounting and consumption smoothing, the COPT allocation distributes
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these efficiency gains by reducing investment and increasing consumption in
the early decades of the program significantly.
The benefits of mitigation are large enough to induce a substitution away
from consumption today toward consumption in the future. The welfare-
maximizing OPT allocation yields lower consumption for the present than
COPT. The alleged climate sacrifice emerges. The opportunity cost of miti-
gation is, however, a benefit if one chooses the BAU allocation as the reference
path. The figure also illustrates that, relative to COPT, there exist alloca-
tions on the OPT schedule which do not require a sacrifice of the present
while increasing future consumption. Such an allocation would, however,
not be optimal, would entail higher environmental damages, and would re-
quire the issuance of government bonds along the lines of Bovenberg and
Heijdra (1998) to be implementable.
2.4 Too-dumb baseline
Karp (2009) discusses a third candidate scenario. This assumes that agents
ignore damages. The GAMS code accompanying DICE-07 states that Nord-
haus partly uses this scenario as his baseline counter to the definition of
Nordhaus (2008) cited in footnote 5.7 While this scenario has the desirable
7In the ‘How to Solve’ sheet of the Excel version of the most recent DICE-09, Nordhaus
states clearly “The “Base” sheet is the sheet with no climate policies. This is the model
optimized for the savings rate. Note that the optimization is done with the damages equal
to zero, and then damages are reinstated.”Numerically, the scenario does not differ much
from the COPT. The sacrifice argument still applies.
At close inspection of the GAMS code, this scenario becomes even more complicated.
It consists of two optimization steps: first, welfare is maximized in the absence of dam-
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property that the representative agent treats climate change as a negative
externality and is not willing to divert resources to mitigation despite its
availability, it is deficient in another one: it is not a rational-expectations
equilibrium, since agents systematically predict damages incorrectly and with
it many relevant variables such as the return to capital.
In summary, given current modeling standards only the BAU reference
path meets both conditions defined above. COPT does not fulfill condition
(ii), the Too-dumb baseline fails at condition (i). Conceptionally, only BAU
is consistent with the standard assumptions about expectation formation and
the information set available to the agent.
3 Modeling the externality baseline in DICE-
07
While Nordhaus (2008) lists the equations of DICE-07, specific assumptions
about parameters and exogenous time profiles are only presented in the pub-
licly available model’s computer code. This section provides a compact guide
for the GAMS-illiterate and presents the extension necessary for the intro-
age. The optimal mitigation control without damage is carried over to a second welfare
maximization in which damages are present. Without further constraints, this would yield
COPT since in the absence of damages the representative agent would always choose zero
mitigation. There are, however, additional constraints covered in the code which yield the
positive mitigation efforts reported by Nordhaus (2008): total carbon emissions have to be
less than total available carbon in the form of oil (6000 Gt C), atmospheric temperature
has to stay below 10◦C, and the stock of carbon in the atmosphere has to stay below 4000
Gt C.
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duction of the GHG externality along the lines of Shiell and Lyssenko (2008).
Conceptionally, the emissions externality is introduced to the economy
by dividing it into N dynasties each endowed with 1/Nth of the aggregate
capital stock and population and each with its representative agent solving
the optimization problem set out below.8 The climate dynamics are gov-
erned by the aggregate emissions of all dynasties. The externality enters
through the assumption that each dynasty’s representative agent takes the
other dynasties’ decision as exogenous but is affected by the damage in-
flicted by aggregate emissions. All agents play a dynamic non-cooperative
game which leads to a Nash equilibrium in which each agent forecasts the
path of emissions correctly and all agents take the same decisions. The dif-
ference between such an equilibrium allocation and an efficient allocation in
which the externality is internalized is the fact that the agent only adjusts
her controls to take account for the self-inflicted damages (i.e. 1/Nth of the
GHG externality). With the exception of the climate interactions, there is
no exchange between dynasties. With N = 1 one obtains the original DICE-
07 social planner maximization problem, the solution of which is the OPT
allocation.
Turning to DICE, it is a Ramsey-Keynes model extended to include car-
bon and temperature dynamics. A representative agent solves the intertem-
8Shiell and Lyssenko (2008) present the details of this approximate method. Since
they focus on the asymptotic behavior of the policy paths, their discussion does not bring
out the critical role of the externality reference path in assessing the opportunity costs of
climate policy.
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poral allocation problem in order to maximize the sum of total discounted
utility. She has the choice of dividing output between consumption, conven-
tional investment, and mitigation. Climate change enters the model through
a damage function of temperature which decreases available output. Besides
the choice variable of investment, the representative agent has the second
choice of abating a certain share of current emissions, thus reducing the
overall amount of GHG in the atmosphere. This second choice variable is
called the control rate, µ(t), and represents the share of current emissions
avoided through mitigation. GHG emissions feed into a carbon cycle which
drives a temperature cycle. Higher emissions lead to a higher global tem-
perature. The flow chart in figure 2 provides an overview of DICE. Stock
variables are bold and choice variables in italics. Exogenous (shifting) factors
such as population, productivity, and carbon intensity are colored gray.
Figure 2: Flowchart of DICE, its Stock Variables (bold) and Control Vari-
ables (italics), and the exogenously shifting factors (gray)
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Timing in the model is a decadal time period with most of the economic
processes occurring as a yearly flow (at yearly parameter values). These flows
have to be compounded to fit the overall decadal time structure. Nordhaus
(2008) solves for 60 periods. Let L(t) be the exogenously given world pop-
ulation path, ρ the yearly discounting factor, and U [c(t)] per capita utility
from per capita consumption, c(t). Then the intertemporal decision problem
is to
max
T∑
t=0
(
1
(1 + ρ)10t
10
L(t)
N
U [c(t)]
)
(1)
Utility is of iso-elastic form: U [c(t)] = c(t)
1−η
1−η . Nordhaus (2008) assumes
η = 2 and ρ = 0.015.
Besides the climate dynamics, which are discussed below, the maximiza-
tion problem is subject to the capital state equation. Let I(t) be yearly
investment and δK = 0.1 yearly depreciation,
K(t+ 1) = 10I(t) + (1− δK) 10K(t) (2)
Potential output equals Y (t) = A(t)K(t)γL(t)1−γ (with γ = 0.3). Note
that this is the output available to each dynasty. Given the CRS of the Cobb-
Douglas technology, aggregate output YAgg(t) = N Y (t) in equilibrium. With
Ω
[
TAT(t)(t)
]
the concave damage function in atmospheric temperature TAT(t)
giving the share of output still usable after damages, C(t) total consumption
and Λ[µ(t)] the cost for the abatement of the control rate µ(t) (i.e. µ percent
of emissions in period t) as a share of output, the output constraint for each
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dynasty’s maximization reads
Ω [TAT(t)]Y (t) = I(t) + C(t) + Λ[µ(t)]Ω [TAT(t)]Y (t). (3)
Initial capital stock is assumed to be K(0) = 137
N
trillion 2005 $ ($T) and
initial output calibrated to Y (0) = 61.1
N
$T per dynasty.
Ω [TAT(t)] gives the share of output still usable after climate damages
due to atmospheric temperature TAT(t). Conversely, damages due to climate
change are 1 − Ω [TAT(t)]. Nordhaus assumes an inverse quadratic damage
function Ω [TAT(t)] =
1
1+ψ1TAT(t)+ψ2TAT(t)
ψ3
with ψ1 = 0, ψ2 = 0.00028388, and
ψ3 = 2.
9 Note that with this functional form Ω [TAT]→ 1 only as TAT →∞.10
Net industrial emissions, EInd, are the non-abated share of potential out-
put multiplied by carbon intensity of production σ(t): EInd(t) = 10(1 −
µ)σ(t)Y (t). Carbon intensity is measured as GtC per $ trillion output and is
assumed to decrease over time. It is calibrated at 0.13418 GtC/$T to match
2005 data and falls at a decreasing rate over time, starting at −6.6% per
decade today.11 Total emissions are the sum of industrial and land defor-
estation emissions. Deforestation emissions start at 11 GtC today and are
9According to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC, 2007), a temperature increase of 4◦C would lead to world output losses of
between 1% and 5%. Ω [TAT(t)] is calibrated to fit this finding. Temperature has increased
by 0.73◦C over the last century. Given Ω [TAT(t)], this corresponds with a current loss of
0.15% of output.
10Damages in DICE are 22% of output at a 10◦C, 50% at a 20◦C increase and 80% at
a 40◦C increase.
11It will have halved in 124 years and will be 15% of its current value in 60 decades.
σ(t) = 0.0137036e−t(0.0708425 + e0.03t)
1
0.03 .
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assumed to decrease by 10% each decade. The introduction of the pollu-
tion externality extends the emissions equation by the emissions regarded as
exogenous by each dynasty
E(t) = EInd(t) + ELand(t) + EExg(t). (4)
In a Nash equilibrium all dynasties take the same action and EExg(t) =
(N − 1)EInd(t). With N = 1, the externality is fully internalized.
In DICE-07 carbon dynamics are modeled via three reservoirs to which
carbon emissions diffuse in a Markov process. First GHG are emitted into
the lower atmosphere. From there, they transition according to equations
(5). Total carbon (in GtC) in the lower atmosphere is MAT(t), in the upper
oceans MUP(t), in the lower oceans MLO(t). With the specific 3×3 transition
matrix, the transition equations are

MAT(t)
MUP(t)
MLO(t)
 = E(t)

1
0
0
+

0.81 0.10 0
0.19 0.85 0.003
0 0.05 0.997


MAT(t− 1)
MUP(t− 1)
MLO(t− 1)
 .
(5)
Initial conditions for the carbon stocks are calibrated to match 2005 data:
MAT(0) = 808.9, MUP(0) = 1255, and MLO(0) = 18365. There is no limit to
the capacity of either reservoir and once carbon has been emitted, it stays
17
in the cycle.12 This implies that in the reference scenario carbon dynamics
cannot converge to a stationary state unless zero output avoids emissions.13
Atmospheric carbon drives atmospheric temperature through radiative
forcing. The IPCC (2007) predicts that a doubling of the atmospheric carbon
concentration compared to pre-industrial levels (MAT1750 = 596.4 Gt C) leads
to an increase in temperature of 3◦C. The forcing term is calibrated to reflect
this finding (through the base 2 logarithm and η2 = 3) and also includes
exogenously given forcing from non-carbon greenhouse gases FEX(t).
14
F (t) = η2Log2
[
MAT(t)
MAT1750
]
+ FEX(t) (6)
DICE-07 also includes a cycle for global atmospheric temperature, TAT(t),
and oceanic temperature, TLO(t). Energy moves between the two media as
to equilibrate the two. Radiative forcing increases atmospheric temperature
linearly:
 TAT(t)
TLO(t)
 =
 .65 .066
.05 .95

 TAT(t− 1)
TLO(t− 1)
+ F (t)
 .22
0
 (7)
12I.e. there is no decay and in equilibrium 0.03% of total emissions will remain in the
atmosphere; 91.5% will sink into the lower oceans.
13This is the reason why Shiell and Lyssenko (2008, p.1558) find that DICE-99 which
first introduced this reservoir specification does “not yield a “realistic” long-run solution
under BAU” and limit their analysis of steady states to the older model version of Nordhaus
(1994).
14FEX(t) = Min[0.036t− 0.06, 0.36].
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Using temperature to determine environmental damage to output closes
the model. The last thing to specify are the exogenous paths of population
and productivity. Nordhaus (2008) follows the UN population projections
which predict that world population will rise from currently 6500 to 8600
million over the next 10 to 20 decades and then stabilize at this level.15
Total Factor Productivity is also assumed to flatten out; however, only in
600 decades at around 15500 times its current value.16
Under business-as-usual, agents adjust their controls to take into account
the implications of 1/Nth of emissions and thus choose positive values of µ(t).
As N increases, µ(t) tends to zero. Only as N →∞ will agents perceive the
marginal social cost of emitting as zero and, therefore, choose zero mitigation
efforts. This is why the method of Shiell and Lyssenko (2008) can only be
considered approximate. In the numerical simulations below, N is set such
that µ(t) < 10−6. Under COPT mitigation is exogenously constrained to
zero. Abatement, however, remains important for the optimal policy scenario
and for this reason the mitigation technology of DICE-07 is included in this
exposition: the control variable µ(t) gives the share of emissions abated. The
iso-elastic abatement cost function Λ[µ(t), t] maps this share into the share
of output necessary to do so:
15Population growth starts at 10% per decade and falls below 1% per decade within 6
decades. L(t) = 8600− 2086e−0.35t.
16Productivity growth is assumed to start at 10% per decade and slowly decrease to
roughly 5% in 60 decades’ time. A(t) = 422.964e−t(−0.092 + e0.01t) 10.01 .
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Λ[µ(t), t] = Ψθ1(t)µ(t)
θ2 (8)
where Ψ is a participation cost markup with Ψ = 1 under complete
participation. Abatement cost is assumed to increase as participation of
countries around the world decreases. The elasticity θ2 = 2.8. θ1(t) is a
scaling factor derived from assumptions about a back-stop technology which
is supposed to decrease in cost over time.17 The assumption of decreases in
mitigation costs in addition to the falling trend of carbon intensity introduces
a tendency toward delaying mitigating efforts (Rezai, 2010).
As outlined above, I solve this model for three scenarios:
- OPT: The efficient allocation in which the externality is internalized
(N = 1). Agents perceive perfect price signals and mitigation efforts
are chosen optimally.
- COPT: The inconsistent, efficient reference path on which the exter-
nality is internalized (N = 1). Agents perceive perfect price signals
and would choose optimal, positive mitigation efforts, but these are
exogenously constrained to zero.
- BAU: The consistent, inefficient reference path on which the externality
is not internalized. Agents perceive their emissions as negligible to
the climate problem. Mitigation efforts are chosen optimally by the
17This time profile of θ1(t) is such that abatement of all emissions (µ = 1) costs 5.6%
of GDP today, 0.9% in 30 decades, and 0.4% in 60 decades. θ1(t)= 0.209(1 + e−0.05t)σ(t).
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dynasties’ representative agent given this imperfect information set. N
is chosen large such that µ(t) = 0.
4 Computational Implementation
All three scenarios are solved on a personal computer using the program
GAMS in combination with the optimization solver CONOPT3. The OPT
and COPT specification fit the program structure of GAMS readily. To im-
plement the BAU in the nonlinear-programming framework, I follow Nord-
haus and Yang (1996) and Shiell and Lyssenko (2008) in adopting an iterative
approach. This starts by setting the time path of emissions exogenous to the
dynasty’s optimization, EExg(t), at an arbitrary (but informed) level. GAMS
solves for the representative dynasty’s welfare-maximizing investment and
mitigation choices conditional on this level of exogenous emissions. (N − 1)
times the dynasty’s emission trajectory implied by these choices defines the
time profile of exogenous emissions in the next iteration step. The routine
is carried out and EExg(t) updated until the difference in the time profiles
between iterations meets a certain criterion. In the solution reported be-
low, the iteration stops if the sum of absolute percentage differences is less
than 10−10. After some tinkering with initial search parameters, the solution
converged to the Nash equilibrium within a few seconds and 10 iterations.
In the BAU scenario, N = 106 to ensure that µ(t) < 10−6 in each time
period. This implies that 99.9999% of aggregate emissions are external to the
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dynasties’ decisions. The cost of carbon is so high that having only 99.99% of
aggregate emissions external (with N = 104) would lead to mitigation efforts
of up to 10% of individual emissions although these only constitute 0.01%
of the aggregate. Shiell and Lyssenko (2008) set N = 300. The high cost
of carbon and their comparatively low choice of N might explain why they
found little difference between the OPT and BAU steady state in DICE-94.
5 Implications for Intergenerational Equity
The implementation of the BAU reference path into DICE reveals two im-
portant aspects: first, the incorrect choice of the COPT baseline causes a
misrepresentation of the social choice problem of mitigating climate change.
Allowing the representative agent to take into account the impact of produc-
tion and investment on emissions lowers the return to capital and induces a
shift to higher consumption and lower investment in the early decades of the
program in the absence of mitigation. This boost to consumption forms the
basis for the climate sacrifice. Second, if one introduces the GHG externality,
this shift and the sacrifice do not occur. The externality leads to imperfect
price signals in the form of inflated interest rates and an inefficiency through
over-investment in conventional capital and under-investment in climate cap-
ital. The adoption of optimal climate policy achieves efficiency gains through
aligning the private cost of carbon with the social one and a rearrangement
of societal investments without lowering consumption; all generations can be
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Figure 3: Interest rate relative to OPT: The absence of the mitigation in-
strument, lowers the return to capital stock (COPT). Under the externality
climate damage is omitted in the calculation of the return to capital. The
interest rate is inflated (BAU).
made better off. The theoretical considerations of Foley (2009) and Stern
(2010) and the numerical results of Rezai et al. (2011) extend to DICE-07.
In general, DICE equilibrium paths follow very similar trajectories in
early periods of the program. Differences in consumption levels are very
small. Rezai (2010) shows that this is due to the fact that there are strong
trends in parameter time profiles, multiple lags in the carbon/temperature
cycles such that impacts of emissions take effect over time, and a soft dam-
age function at moderate and high levels of atmospheric temperature. By
plotting variables relative to OPT, however, one can uncover the described
features of COPT and BAU in DICE-07.
Figures 3 plots the trajectories of the interest rate. The interest rate plays
a central role in the allocation of resources in optimal growth frameworks. As
explained in section 2, under BAU the interest rate is higher than under OPT.
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The adoption of optimal climate policy lowers the private return to capital.
The agent diverts resources to mitigation and consumption. In contrast,
under COPT the interest rate is below its OPT level. Under optimal climate
policy, consumption levels are lowered to finance mitigation and additional
investment expenditure.
The effects of the interest rate on investment and consumption are shown
in figure 4 and 5. Under BAU, agents choose to invest more and consume
less than under OPT. However, as environmental damage increases, capital
accumulation and consumption eventually fall. Welfare under BAU could
be increased by tilting the investment portfolio toward less carbon-emitting
and more climate capital. This is the externality-induced inefficiency of the
BAU path. Under COPT, agents are aware of the deleterious effects of their
investment decision and behave cooperatively. They choose to invest less
and consume more than under OPT. Capital stock lies consistently below
its OPT level which enables higher consumption in the early periods of the
program. The adoption of an optimal mitigation response would lead to a
welfare loss in the first three periods.
Due to mitigation expenditure, per capita consumption under OPT is
slightly lower in two periods than under BAU. In terms of lifetime welfare,
however, OPT dominates BAU. To draw welfare conclusions for distinct gen-
erations from the results of the infinitely-lived agent model, I assume that
each agent lives 70 years and has optimal bequest motives. For agents alive
today, i.e. the decade of 2005, figure 6 reports the remaining lifetime welfare
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Figure 4: Capital Stock relative to OPT: In the absence of the mitigation
instrument, lower levels of capital stock are efficient (COPT). The externality
leads to over-accumulation (BAU).
under the different (no-)policy scenarios.
Figure 6 demonstrates once more that the adoption of an optimal policy
response to climate change mitigation has very different welfare effects de-
pending on the choice of the reference path. Under the inconsistent COPT,
most cohorts alive today lose from positive mitigation efforts. Only genera-
tions born after 1985 can gain from it. Were the policy action put to a vote
with a majority rule, it would be rejected. Using BAU as the reference path
changes the picture of the social choice problem of mitigation completely. All
generations alive today and in the future experience a welfare gain from the
correction of the market failure through the implementation of institutions
which enforce cost transparency. In short, using the correct reference path
implies that there is no opportunity cost to mitigating climate change and
that the adoption of an optimal policy response represents a Pareto improve-
ment.
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Figure 5: Per Capita Consumption relative to OPT: The COPT no-policy
baseline yields higher consumption levels in the first decades. An adoption
of optimal policy forces these cohorts to make a sacrifice. The externality
BAU baseline does not entail a reduction in consumption.
Much of the debate on intergenerational equity centers on the choice of the
discount factor since it determines what weight is given to the distant benefits
of mitigation compared to the costs incurred today. These considerations are
of subordinate relevance to the question of the opportunity cost of climate
change mitigation, since the effects of variations in the discount factor affect
the correct no-policy and the optimal policy scenario in a similar fashion. In
a numerical sensitivity analysis, only a discount rate greater than 0.1/year
would lead to a rejection by majority rule.
6 Conclusion
Conventional wisdom holds that present generations need to sacrifice part
of their consumption to protect the world from climate change and thereby
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Figure 6: Lifetime Welfare of Generations born at t relative to OPT: Under
COPT an optimal policy leads to a lifetime welfare loss for the majority of
generations alive today. In contrast, this adoption creates a Pareto improve-
ment for all generations under BAU. Note that for generations alive today
the figure reports remaining lifetime welfare.
preserve consumption possibilities for the future. This assessment of the
opportunity cost of mitigating climate change, however, rests on a theoreti-
cally inconsistent no-policy scenario (COPT). Given current methodological
standards, only a reference path on which GHG emissions are a negative
externality (BAU) can consistently feature zero mitigation.
Foley (2009) and Stern (2010) demonstrate that such an externality leads
to a market failure and an inefficient allocation of resources. Numerical re-
sults based on DICE-07 support this point. By implementing the externality
in it and solving for the equilibrium allocation, one can illustrate that under
COPT consumption is inflated in early periods of the program due to low
returns to capital investment. Climate policy increases the returns to capi-
tal and stimulates investment. Consumption levels fall relative to COPT in
order to finance mitigation and additional investment. Present generations,
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therefore, have to bear a sacrifice. When using the correct reference path
(BAU) this intergenerational conflict disappears. Under BAU calculations
of the return to capital exclude climate damage and are above the social
optimum. The internalization of the externality lowers the return to cap-
ital and discourages investment. Under climate policy, these resources are
directed toward mitigation and higher consumption levels. The correction of
the market failure makes all generations better off and represents a Pareto
improvement. This result is even more stricking as studies based on DICE
usually find the opposite.
The debate on intergenerational discounting has attracted much attention
from researchers in the past. The finding that there is no intergenerational
trade-off at the heart of the social choice problem of mitigation policy in
standard models of climate change might help re-direct some of this atten-
tion to problems of market imperfections and remove theoretical objections
to the adoption of mitigation strategies as called for in Stern (2010). It is
important to note, though, that considerations of discounting and consump-
tion smoothing remain relevant to the debate, since they identify the optimal
policy response and provide answers to the questions of “how much?” and
“how fast?”.
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